What Should Awami League Do Now?

Awami League’s future course of action depends on three questions. They are:

  • Do Awami League’s new generation of leaders think of her as an asset or a liability?
  • How comfortable will the military government be with dealing with Amir Hossain Amu or Tofael Ahmed?
  • How accepting would Awami League grassroots leaders and workers be of an election campaign without Sheikh Hasina?

Before we start delving on the answers to these questions, let’s talk a little background. While I think Awami League had a very good chance of winning the January 2007 election, it was by no means guaranteed. The move to rope in Ershad had cost AL much more than it should have, and the allocation of seats with Dr. B Chowdhury’s BDB and Ershad’s JP left too few seats to give to the electoral allies within the 14-party alliance itself. Moreover, after the 2001 debacle, Sheikh Hasina distanced herself from the entire first-rung Awami League leadership: primarily Tofael Ahmed, Suranjit Sengupta, Abdur Razzaq, and Motia Chowdhury. Mohammed Nasim she still depended on as her point man for street agitations, while the indignity she visited on Mohammed Hanif is well-documented. To replace them, she promoted an alternate, younger leadership: Obaidul Quader, Kazi Zaforullah, Sheikh Selim and Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir. Abdul Jalil, Abdul Hamid, Shah Kibria and Zillur Rahman were kept on as established senior leaders with their own political bases who would not challenge Hasina’s leadership. This division festered throughout the entire 2001-2006 period, and peaked  when the nominating process got under way. The party headed to the January 2007 election very much a house divided against itself.

After the military government took over, in their efforts to “minus” Sheikh Hasina from politics, they brutally cracked down on the leadership promoted by Sheikh Hasina, while aiding the senior anti-Hasina faction of the party to take over party. They have not fully succeeded yet, but the fact that AL went to the pre-dialogue based on a sms rather than a formal invitation letter as they had originally demanded, the continuous curtailment of programs demanding Sheikh Hasina’s freedom, and the recent announcement that a military presence in the talks between the government and the political parties would be acceptable, are all signs of the sway that this faction has gained over the decision-making process.

With that in mind, let’s turn to the questions posted above. A new generation of leaders have also emerged in Awami League, former student leaders from Chatra League and Jubo League and successful entrepreneurs who have established themselves in Bangladeshi society and chose the Awami brand of politics to make their mark. This group of leaders came to politics to leave a mark on the nation, if it can be demonstrated to them that they can do so clearly and honorably without Sheikh Hasina, they may decide to reinvent the party without her.

Opposed to this is the soft corner that every Bangladeshi holds for Sheikh Mujib and his progeny, the ideological fervor of those who see Hasina as the best hope for the Bangladesh that was envisioned in 1972, and the real disgust at seeing the mistreatment being meted out to this former Prime Minister by the military government.

Could Amir Hossain Amu balance the military’s exit strategy while keeping the party united behind him? Absolutely not. This man has only won one general election in his life, and even that the by-election after the sitting MP from Jhalkathi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had an untimely death (he promptly lost the next election to Mr. Bhutto’s widow, Elaine Bhutto). Could Tofael Ahmed do it? Certainly. He has the political savvy, he has the street credentials, and he has the history to provide the leadership, but even for the architect of the 1994-96 street agitations, this will be a hard act. However, if he can’t do it, then nobody else in Awami League can.

It will be a supreme piece of irony if Tofael Ahmed finishes in 2008 what he started in 1975, while head of Sheikh Shaheb’s Praetorian Guard.

What would be the reaction of the AL grassroots if the party went to the elections without Sheikh Hasina? Could it be sold to them as a ploy that would free Hasina and install AL in the government in the same time? No, it can not. AL is still blessed to have the most exclusively political apparatus of any political party in Bangladesh. An entire generation of men and women have given their lives to this party, and they will not be so easily swayed by the promise of government power.

All of which explains Sheikh Hasina’s recent confidence that she will contest in the next parliamentary elections at the head of Awami League.

So much for minus two. 

9 Responses to “What Should Awami League Do Now?”

  1. xanthis Says:

    Before people shout, before Awami League supporters shout, Sheikh Hasina herself will shake matters up if Amu-Tofael gang goes to election without her.

  2. fugstar Says:

    realise their fundamental incapacity on theoretical and practical plains, call it a day and cease to pollute the political space with their poison?

    bnp would crumble (further) as a responce. and then there would be reorganisation of talents and leeches around better ideas.

  3. xanthis Says:

    Anybody has detected? That a chain of legal actions has been sparkled after she told she’ll be in the election.

    Saifur Rahman has changed the situation a bit by his preflight speech. I think Tacit should start writing a post, “What Should This Regime Do Now?”.

  4. Jyoti Says:

    I think there was more to AL’s strategy in the period leading to Jan 2007 election than is described above.

    A Grand Alliance by itself wouldn’t have helped AL. If Ershad had joined AL, he would have given Hasina 15-20 more seats in North Bengal. Throw in B CHowdhury, Oli and other BNP renegades, and you’re still looking at maximum 25 seats switching from BNP to the Grand Alliance. This still would have left BNP with a comfortable majority. To win, AL had to take 75 or so seats from BNP in Dhaka, Barisal and Chittagong divisions. There was nothing in Grand Alliance that facilitated this.

    This could happen in one of two ways. One way would have been if the jatiyatabadi vote was divided in these seats. This was the case in 1996, when JP did very well (getting 20-25% votes in the seats that switched from BNP to AL). If LDP could put up a competitive candidate in Ghazipur and Chandpur, then AL could win those seats.

    Another possibility was if enough dhaner sheesh voters stayed home. This really was AL’s best shot - a very well co-ordinated campaign that highlighted the price of rice (28 taka in 2006 vs 14 taka in 2001), law and order, and the alleged corruption of BNP big wigs should have been enough to discourage enough dhaner sheesh voters from showing up.

    AL, of course, went the andolon way. This is not to say its grievances were not real - they were. But in addition to those reasons, it wanted an andolon because it thought winning the andolon would have helped it achieve both the above. And freely distributing seats to JP and LDP was part of that andolon - ‘have as many seats as you want so long as you boycott the election if I say so’, this was Hasina’s message to Ershad and B Chowdhury. And it worked, until the coup that is.

    Turning to the present, there is a widespread belief - among AL-ers, opinionmakers (see Farid Bakht’s Forum piece or comments at UV, and even many Khaleda loyalists - that the jatiyatabadi vote is divided because Khaleda is not going to play ball with the regime. So, AL thinks that even without Hasina, it will win.

    I have given my reasons for scepticism about it in UV:
    http://www.drishtipat.org/blog/2008/05/01/the-unfortunate-exit-strategy/#comment-151940

    Here let me highlight what Faisal Salahuddin calls the Gen B voters. There really is a generation of ’successful entrepreneurs (and professionals) who have established themselves in Bangladeshi society (not just the high society, but across the country in every sphere of life) and chose the Awami brand of politics to make their mark’. It is these voters that hold the key to the 2008 election.

  5. AJ Says:

    If Sheik Hasina ever came to power again, I would be ashamed of calling my self a Bangladeshi. Whey does she scream democracy when she doesn’t promote democracy within her own party? Why does she always have to be the leader? AL is the same as BNP they are all sell outs.

  6. Nikhil Says:

    Hasina again going flee from Bangladesh! Such a corrupt and coward lady! Shame on Hasina and her terrorist Rajakar party!

    On the other hand, our former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia yesterday ruled out any possibility of going abroad, saying that she would have medical treatment at home if necessary. Lady Khaleda insist to stay with the people as she has been. She is real patriot; not shameless like Hasina.

  7. sotacit Says:

    It will be a huge defeat for the military government if Sheikh Hasina actually does get to leave Bangladesh. There are some signs that she may be able to leave he country, and I for one, earnestly hope that she is allowed to leave, but her arrival abroad will be a massive blow for the military government. She will make them rue the day they arrested her.

  8. Udayan Says:

    Nikhil, today it seems Khaleda wants overseas treatment for her sons:

    http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=40635

    Does this now make her, to use your analysis, “corrupt and coward lady”?

  9. Chowdhury Irad Ahmed Siddiky Says:

    It is becoming increasingly clear that the army has struck deals with the two netris to get them out of their way.

    (1) For Hasina whose family is in United States, Bangladesh is basically a second home. She endured prison time over a year and realized that she cannot participate in the elections this time due to the minus-two scheme of the army. This realization, coupled with strong nostalgia to see the rest of her family in the United States, and the strong possibility of awami League’s return to power even in her absence, given BNP’s widespread unpopularity, makes leaving for the United States temporarily the best possible option.

    In December, if Awami League is voted to power, even without Hasina, then a victorious Awami League will bring Hasina back to constest in a by-election (by making one of its MPs resign) and subsequently bring her back to Prime Ministership.

    However, in the unlikely scenario of AL’s not winning the elections and coming to power, Hasina will have the option to remain in the United States with her children and stay put there and run her party. This is better than staying in jail in a martial law or staying in jail under the next BNP regime that might not release her from her pending law suits.

    (2) For Khaleda Zia who has no second home anywhere else in the world, Bangladesh is her first and the last home. Like Hasina, Khaleda too has commitments to her children, however, Khaleda is neither as smart or clever as Hasina in managing her children by parachuting them overseas. Therefore, she negotiated with the army to manage her commitment to send her two ailing sons to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment in exchange for not participating in the polls.

    Now, if BNP coincidentally returns to power by miracle, Khaleda, like Hasina can be elected to the parliament through a by-election (one of her MPs will resign and vacate that seat) and subsequently become the prime minister.

    However, in the likely event of BNP’s not returning to power, Khaleda’s predicament could be worse than Hasina as the Awami League regime of the future will most definitely not do away with her pending law suits and since she has not second home in the United States like Hasina, she can be easily caught and made to serve very long jail sentences like Ershad did in the 1990s.

    Exceptions:

    The only exception to this is that the army will have a deal before the 2 netris to not let them contest in any elections indefinitely or at least long and difficult enough for them to stay in politics. The army can also find creative ways to raise the survival stakes of these two ladies.

    Conclusion:

    Whatever it might be, by this latest move, the army has found a clever way to exit the stage by implementing a minus-2 political scheme by not letting the two netris contest temporarily in the immediate election and thereby assuring the scope of passing a bill of indemnity by the legislature that will be elected in this election. This same legislature can then bring back its netri to power through a by-election and make her the prime minister as usual. The pledge of the army to the international donors of not letting the two netris return is also materialized. This is a win-win situation for all parties.

    Finally, this is the beginning of a Grand DEFEAT of 1/11 as the army could not reform the body politic as it promised but ended up proving once again and through a very costly process that the GREAT Shushills like Drs. Kamal Hussain, Mohammad Yunus, Mozaffar Ahmed and others are “Rational Fools” when it comes to Real Politic.

    Bibliographical Note:

    (See: “Rational Fools” by Amartya Sen, in Philosophy and Public Affairs Journal, 1977).

    ~ Chowdhury Irad Ahmed Siddiky.

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